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Bad Timing For Deeds In Lieu
by Professor Roger Bernhardt*

A recent decision made me think that
it was time to write about what I think
are some misapprehensions about the
effectiveness of deeds in lieu of foreclosure. In Hendrickson v JGR Properties
Inc. 2008 WL 5053440, Ohio Court
of Appeals, December 2008), JRG
acquired property on March 30, and
on April 3, it gave Hendrickson a note,
a mortgage (probably a junior), and a
warranty deed to that property, which
Hendrickson recorded on February
23, 2007, when JGR defaulted on
Hendrickson’s loan.
In subsequent litigation, JRG sought
to set aside the warranty deed and
Hendrickson sought to foreclose the
mortgage. The trial court held the warranty deed invalid as prejudicing JGR’s
right of redemption, but left the mortgage intact, a decision which the Court
of Appeal affirmed.
That much of the decision is perfectly
logical and should be widely accepted. A
deed covering the same property that was
made security for a mortgage, and given
at the same time that the loan is made
and the mortgage was taken is always
invalid. The contemporaneous deed in
lieu never works. (Although this lender
apparently did not know about that rule,
since it went ahead and labeled the document “Agreement Deed Held By Lender
For Security,” more or less inviting any
observer to recognize the deed as being
something other than a real deed.)
It is elementary law that when a lender
holds a mortgage as security for its

loan, on default it has to foreclose on
that mortgage if it wants to realize on
the security. The equity of redemption,
i.e., the right of a debtor to pay late,
can be cut off only by going through
a proper (“foreclosure”) procedure, a
requirement that the system has had
for some 500 years. Even though the
transaction may have been drafted as
some kind of conditional fee, a mortgagee cannot just take the debtor’s
property on the instant that a default
has occurred.
It did not take the chancellors, who first
created this right, long to realize that
creditors disliked that mandatory delay
requirement and would require their
necessitous borrowers to waive it as a
condition to getting a loan. It is therefore hardly surprising that the chancellors quickly came up with a companion
rule prohibiting lenders from drafting
around the foreclosure requirement—
the rule against clogging—making it a
necessary counterpart to the equity of
redemption.
A deed absolute given by the mortgagor at the same time and as a
companion to a mortgage is always
invalid as a clog on redemption. If
it were allowed to operate as stated,
it would allow the lender to record
the deed on default and immediately
claim the property, without the inconvenience of a redemption period or
foreclosure or sale beforehand. That
is why the courts will always declare
the contemporaneous deed in lieu
unenforceable.
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But the situation is not always that
simple. In Hendrickson case the creditor argued that the court should follow
another decision it had earlier rendered
(“Gormas”) which had upheld a deed in
lieu of foreclosure that had been given
by a mortgagor after the mortgage had
been given. (In Hendrickson, the deed
had been delivered a week after the
mortgagor grantor had acquired the
title, but on the same day that it borrowed the money and signed the mortgage.) The timing, argued the creditor,
changed the analysis.
It is true that the rule for contemporaneously executed deeds in lieu of foreclosure is not automatically applied to
deeds in lieu that are executed subsequently to the execution of the mortgage. Two reasons are often given for
making this distinction.
One explanation is that the presumption that the borrower is necessitous
applies only at the time of inception
of the loan—when the borrower is too
desperate as to sign anything, and not
thereafter. This reasoning is not in fact
very persuasive, since borrowers who
cannot keep up their already existing
loans are probably far more threatened
and prepared to cooperate concede to
demands, as the recent foreclosure rescue scammers well know.
The other reason is better. A deed absolute executed by a mortgagor subsequent to the original execution of the
mortgage might merely be the mechanism for completing a true conveyance
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of the property; a step that an owner of
property is entitled to take even though
his or her title is subject to a mortgage.
If the mortgagor is free to sell mortgaged property to a third person, there
is no special reason why she should not
be equally free to sell it to the mortgagee. Sale of the equity by the mortgagor to the mortgagee should be no
more invalid than a sale to a stranger;
that the purchaser is the lender might
make a court watchful of the transaction
but would not lead to automatic invalidation, as is the case for the contemporaneous deed in lieu (which would
never be intended to function as a true
sale). So a deed in lieu that is given after
the mortgage has already been executed
may be enforceable notwithstanding
that one given at the same time as the
mortgage is not.
The Court of Appeal in Hendrickson
was unwilling to rely on its earlier
Gormas decision that had validated
a subsequent deed in lieu, because it
was clear there whether or not that
subsequent deed had been given to a
new third-party lender who was coming into the picture to bail the mortgagor out on an existing defaulted loan
or given to the original lender who
was just engaging in some workout
refinancing.
That thinking is dangerous, although
more common than it should be in
many cases. A subsequent deed in lieu
is not always valid just because it was
not contemporaneous (and its validity
should certainly not depend on whether
the grantee was the original mortgagee
or a different third party).
It is true that there is distinction
between a contemporaneous and a subsequent deed in lieu of foreclosure and
that the former (contemporaneous) is
always bad. But it should not be true

that, conversely, the deed in lieu given
subsequent to the execution of the initial mortgage is therefore always good.
There are two different kinds of subsequent deed in lieu transactions and they
must be treated differently.
When a borrower who is hopelessly
underwater executes a deed to the property to its lender in order to avoid foreclosure, and both sides appreciate that
the deal is over, the loan is gone, and
that they are walking away from each
other, then that deed ought to be as valid
as any other deed executed by an owner,
even though it has been delivered to the
former mortgagee of the property. That
is a true sale. Some court intimate that
the transaction has to be extra fair to be
upheld, but that is not really good conveyancing law; a lender purchasing the
property of its former borrower ought
to be as free as anyone else to bargain
for a good price or good terms, and the
transaction should be set aside only on
the same sort of grounds as would upset
a purchase by an outside.
What needs be scrutinized closely where
the grantee is the former lender is not
the terms of the purchase but whether
it really is a purchase that is occurring,
rather than merely a refinancing and/or
extending of the old loan relationship.
A true sale of the property—whether to
the lender or to a third party—means
that the property is not the owner’s
anymore (and the previous mortgage
relationship is by definition, over). A
refinancing of the old loan means that
the property does still belong to the
same old owner.
In its earlier Gormas decision, the
Ohio court had noted that the new
money that was given to the owners
was paid not to acquire their title but
to give them more time to pay off their
debts. That transaction was not a sale

of their property, such as described
in the previous paragraph; the former
owners remained as current owners
of the property. They did not say to
themselves “now we no longer own
that property,” rather they said “we
can still keep that property if we can
later on pay off this new debt.” That
describes a mortgage rather than a
sale. That deed the owners gave in
return for that money was not intended
to transfer their title away but merely
to secure another obligation imposed
against their continued title. Whether
the money came from the old lender
or from a new one made no difference;
the subsequent deed was not a deed
but a mortgage device, regardless of
who it named as grantee.
While a contemporaneous deed in lieu
can be said to always be automatically
invalid, the question to be asked of a
subsequent deed in lieu is not so much
whether it is valid or invalid, but rather,
if valid then valid as what? A subsequent deed in lieu truly given to transfer
title to the lender and end the mortgage
relationship should be valid as a deed
(even if the terms are harsh, so long as
there is no fraud). But if the instrument
is given instead as a vehicle to allow
the mortgagor hold on the land a little
longer, in return the mortgagee having
an easier time in taking it away from her
later on, then its validity—if any—is as
a mortgage, not a deed.
An executory or conditionally effective deed in lieu of foreclosure—one
that is to be recorded or otherwise take
effect only at a later time if the mortgagor fails to properly perform some
obligation - is just another form of
mortgage, a mortgage on the equity of
redemption, whose terms would permit the mortgagee to take the property
without having to go through a foreclosure and sale.
continued on page 15
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Bad Timing For Deeds In Lieu
continued from page 5

The distinction between a deed in lieu
intended to function as a deed and one
intended to function as a mortgage is
often slippery. It was easy enough to recognize in a situation like Hendrickson,
where the agreement explicitly provided that the deed be recorded only
if there was a later default. But was it
the “later” or the “default” feature that
mattered most? When a deed is delivered into escrow with instructions to
be recorded in 30 days, with no further
explanation, was it intended to give the
owner 30 days to pack his belongings
to get out (a true conveyance), or was
it intended to give him 30 more days
to solve his problems (like a mortgage
extension)? Will the outcome depend
on what each party recollects saying to
the other about those matters? If there
is no conditional language in the original escrow instructions but the grantor
has some kind of option to stay in possession or to repurchase, what is it?
And when a court decides that the document really is a mortgage rather than
a conveyance, what is the consequence
of that determination? Is the instrument
now invalid, even if it was executed
under superfair conditions? But if it is
valid, can it operate as a mortgage that
does not have to be foreclosed? And if,
as a mortgage, it has to be foreclosed,
it contains no power of sale clause (it
would not dare to include one), so any
foreclosure would have to be judicial. Or can the mortgagee ignore this
“junior” mortgage instrument and exercise its remedies against its original
mortgage or deed of trust, exercising
the power of sale clause it contains?
(Hendrickson seems to have been trying to do something like that.) Or has
the deed in lieu somehow displaced or
replaced the original? And if the best
The Abstract
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result of having this deed in lieu comes
from ignoring it, what was gained by
demanding it in the first place?
A deed in lieu perhaps works if the borrower quietly disappears after defaulting.
But if he or she stays to make trouble,
the lender holding that deed may regret
that it ever got what it asked for. u
*Roger Bernhardt is a Professor of
Law at Golden Gate University in San
Francisco and Editor of CEB’s California
Real Property Law Reporter.
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